Epidemic security
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Major Gaps In FBI’s
Investigation Of 2001 Anthrax Attacks, GAO Finds
By: Amanda Vicinanzo, Senior Editor
12/22/2014 (10:36am)
The genetic tests
conducted by the FBI in the wake of the 2001 Anthrax attacks were plagued
by key scientific gaps, according to
a recent Government Accountability Office audit report.
Only a week after the
tragic September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the nation was shaken after
letters laced with Bacillus anthracis Ames strain were mailed
through the US postal system, killing five people and infecting 17 others.
Efforts led by the FBI
to characterize the material contained in the letters and identify the
individual responsible for the mailings involved extensive scientific study
spanning almost nine years -- an investigation the FBI described as "one
of the largest and most complex in the history of law enforcement.”
Working in collaboration
with various public health entities and the US Postal Inspection Service, the
FBI determined that the spores in the letters were derived from a single
spore-batch of the Ames strain in a flask called “RMR-1029.”
The identification of
the Ames strain significantly reduced the number of possible sources of the
material used in the attack. In fact, this scientific evidence allowed the FBI
to focus its investigation on the limited number of laboratories that had had
access to the Ames strain before the attacks.
The FBI consulted with the
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
which conducted an independent review of the FBI’s scientific research and
concluded “it is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the
origins of the B. anthracis in the mailing based on the
available scientific evidence alone.”
Based on the findings of
NAS, GAO launched a review of the FBI’s genetic test development process and
statistical analyses that corroborated NAS’ review.
GAO found the genetic
tests that were conducted by the FBI’s four contractors were generally
scientifically verified and validated and met the FBI’s criteria. However, the
FBI lacked a comprehensive approach—or framework—that could have ensured
standardization of the testing process.
“The use of a
standardized approach to verification and validation from the beginning could
have more definitively established the performance of all the genetic tests,”
GAO reported. “It could have helped in communicating expectations clearly,
ensuring confidence in results generated by any genetic tests developed.”
In February 2010, the
FBI closed the case—dubbed “Amerithrax”—concluding that an Army microbiologist
by the name of Bruce E. Ivins had perpetrated the attack alone. The case was
never brought to court and the alleged perpetrator of the attack died on July
29, 2008, from an overdose of acetaminophen.
GAO did not take a
position on whether Ivins was behind the mailing of the anthrax-filled
envelopes.
In addition to the gaps
identified in the NAS’ report, the suitability of using mutations as genetic
markers for analyzing evidentiary samples to determine their origins is not
clear. GAO determined that lack of this knowledge has implications for both the
development of genetic tests and analysis of the results.
"The Department of
Homeland Security [DHS] is currently funding some research on genetic changes
in bacteria and genome sequencing methods, among others,” GAO said.
“Such research is a step
in the right direction since the FBI is planning to use genome sequencing
methods in future investigations. However, because this research may not be
complete for several more years, the extent to which it will close this gap is
not known.”
Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ),
who was among three members of the House who requested the audit from GAO,
said, “The report confirms what I have often said: that the FBI’s definitive
conclusions about the accuracy of their scientific findings in the Amerithrax
case are not, in fact, definitive.”
“The United States needs
a comprehensive, independent review of the Amerithrax investigation to ensure
we have learned the lessons from this bio attack,” he said.
Moving forward, GAO
recommended the FBI collaborate with DHS in developing a verification and
validation framework that could be deployed at the outset of all future
investigations.
“Responses to future
incidents could be improved by using a standardized framework for achieving
minimum performance standards during verification and validation, and by
incorporating statistical analyses when interpreting validation testing
results,” GAO said.
GAO added, however,
that, “Although we identified several aspects of the FBI’s scientific methods
we reviewed that could be improved in a future investigation, we recognize that
in 2001, the FBI was faced with an unprecedented case.”
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