Moles

Claim: FSB traitor with fake ID took CIA money to frame Russia 


Colonel Sergei Mikhailov was arrested in December on the charge that he leaked information to the US allegedly showing that the FSB hacked and meddled in the American presidential election.

A new report from TV channel REN claims Sergei Mikhailov was originally recruited by the CIA during a vacation in a Mediterranean country. They added, citing security services sources, that he was considered a high level cyber asset by American intelligence heads.

In addition, investigative newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported that Sergei Mikhailov used a fake identity for up to seven years, strengthening the claim he was operating as a CIA double agent.

'It was suspected that perhaps Mikhailov is not really called Mikhailov,' Novaya Gazeta reported. “Two sources pointed to him being 'a foreign intelligence mole inside the FSB’.”

Moles

Arrested Russian FSB Agents Allegedly Passed Information to CIA

A top cybersecurity specialist and his deputy in Russia’s intelligence service, the FSB, are reportedly being accused by the Kremlin of “breaking their oath” by working with America’s Central Intelligence Agency.

Sergei Mikhailov, allegedly detained at a board meeting last December, and his deputy, Dmitry Dokuchaev, were arrested by the Kremlin on Jan. 27 for treason and illegal hacking. Then, on Tuesday, Russian news agency Interfax, after hearing from unidentified sources, reported that they, along with Ruslan Stoyanov, the head of cybercrime investigations at Kaspersky Labs, and a fourth, as yet unnamed person, are suspected of passing along secret information to the CIA — or of passing it to someone who passed it to the CIA.

Moles

Blowing Sources and Public Intelligence Claims

What seems most notable, of course, is that the IC report (and accompanying press discussion) appeared to reveal some very deep penetration of Russian discussions.  Assertions that "we saw them celebrating" and "we saw Putin's directions" were signposts for any able counter-intelligence operation.  In particular, the level of detail would suggest to Russian CI that there were human sources involved.

Today we see the costs of the public discussion of intelligence.  I admit to speculating here (though with good reason, I think) but two of our sources (including one in Kaspersky) are now blown and the reason may well be that we felt the need to publicly disclose the information we gleaned from their efforts in order to publicly defend the IC against President Trump's unjustified and unjustifiable attacks.  To be fair, part of the reason for the need for the publication was also the Obama administration's remarkable reluctance to act earlier this year and the relatively laughable nature of the sanctions we imposed.  They had the tools but failed to use them.  And as a result, two men will, I think .... die.