Information security

The Government Is Classifying Too Many Documents

The 2,000-plus officials who are authorized to make initial classification decisions exercise their individual judgments as to whether disclosure would harm national security. They have extremely broad discretion, and they are not required to explain their thinking. Given the subjectivity of the analysis, agencies frequently come to different conclusions about the sensitivity of the same piece of information. Needless to say, this would not happen if the appropriate classification status were self-evident.

Moreover, officials encounter multiple incentives to err liberally on the side of classification. It is easier and safer for busy, risk-averse national-security officials to make classification the default. It also greases the skids when pursuing policy initiatives that otherwise might require broad buy-in. It can hide embarrassing facts or evidence of misconduct. And it serves as a way for officials to enhance their status or protect their agencies’ turf. There are no disincentives on the other side of the scale, as classification decisions normally go unreviewed and agencies do not punish officials for classifying too much.

This subjectivity, discretion, and skewed incentive structure combine to produce massive “overclassification,” a phenomenon noted by experts and blue-ribbon commissions for decades. Current and former government officials have estimated that 50 to 90 percent of classified documents could safely be released.