Nuclear security
Of all the pieces of Cold War-era jargon that have wormed their way into the cultural zeitgeist, none has been more pervasive (or sobering) than MAD, or mutual assured destruction. The strategic reasoning of MAD is as simple as it is deadly: two adversaries, each with vast numbers of deployed nuclear warheads on high alert, refrain from attacking one another out of fear of unacceptable retaliatory damage. With their adversary’s arsenal secured against even the most overwhelming assault, the reasoning follows, a country’s strategic planners would never engage in a first strike. It was this lethal logic that guided Cold War superpower relations after the development of the “trident” system of three-pronged deployment: bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-delivered warheads. This dispersion guaranteed warhead survivability and ensured stability between the United States and the USSR, if at the expense of tremendous uncertainty over the performance of early warning systems.
Of all the pieces of Cold War-era jargon that have wormed their way into the cultural zeitgeist, none has been more pervasive (or sobering) than MAD, or mutual assured destruction. The strategic reasoning of MAD is as simple as it is deadly: two adversaries, each with vast numbers of deployed nuclear warheads on high alert, refrain from attacking one another out of fear of unacceptable retaliatory damage. With their adversary’s arsenal secured against even the most overwhelming assault, the reasoning follows, a country’s strategic planners would never engage in a first strike. It was this lethal logic that guided Cold War superpower relations after the development of the “trident” system of three-pronged deployment: bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-delivered warheads. This dispersion guaranteed warhead survivability and ensured stability between the United States and the USSR, if at the expense of tremendous uncertainty over the performance of early warning systems.
No comments:
Post a Comment