Arms control

Missile proliferation: Treat the disease

In discussions of export controls, proliferators are usually the focus. But maybe the focus should fall instead on the hypocrisy of states that set the rules.

My roundtable colleague Masako Ikegami has rightly pointed out that double standards in arms control instruments, by exacerbating insecurity, actually invite proliferation. And I have discussed, taking drones as an example, the way that export controls can be misused to serve ulterior agendas.

Members of the nuclear club, both recognized and de facto, feel little compunction about furthering their own nuclear weapon delivery capabilities. Hypersonic missiles offer a contemporary case in point. An arms race is coming in hypersonic vehicles and it will be wasteful and destabilizing; on this point, there is broad consensus. But the United States, Russia, China, and India—all nations with hypersonic programs—show little inclination to limit their "post-ballistic" capabilities in WMD delivery. It's clearly hypocritical for these nuclear weapon states to demand that others show restraint in their ballistic and cruise missile activity. Meanwhile, certain proliferators that possess both nuclear weapons and advanced missiles—Israel, for example—are allowed comparatively unhindered access to missile know-how and hardware. Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to defend the strict export controls that are imposed on many states.