AIR, STRATEGY, STRATEGY & POLICY
The
United States Air Force needs to replace the Minuteman III ICBM fleet
at the three nuclear missile bases in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota.
Critics decry the cost of a proposed
replacement, thought to be in the range of
several hundred billion dollars. Their main argument against replacing ICBMs is not
the cost of
replacing the Minuteman III. The critics say we just don’t need them. They
are, they say, a “Cold War relic.”
The fact that nuclear
peer Russia and near-peer China are modernizing their
ICBM forces is
often lost on those critics. While the reasons why are debatable, Russia’s
recent aggression on a variety of fronts has left many Russia apologists
dumbfounded. Russia isn’t just modernizing its ICBMs. At a frequency
unprecedented since the Cold War, Russian nuclear-capable bombers
are penetrating the American Air Defense Identification Zone’s (ADIZ) in
both the continental United States and around Guam. Russia, unlike the US,
is investing heavily to modernize their nuclear triad — delivery
vehicles and weapons. The Russians seem intent on relying on their nuclear
force to counter American conventional military superiority.
Adam Lowther
China likewise is
improving its nuclear forces. The DF-41— a multiple reentry vehicle ICBM —was recently tested
successfully. They are also working on improving
their nuclear submarine capability, placing new submarine-launched ballistic
missiles on Jin class nuclear submarines. To deter such capabilities America
requires a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent for decades to come.
Why
ICBMs?
The fact that the
basics of the ICBM mission have not changed much since these systems were first
fielded may explain why some believe they are outdated. Before we commit to
deactivating this weapon system, it is important to consider some of its
benefits.
Col. Robert S.
Spalding
First, ICBMs provide
an excellent deterrent to nuclear attack on the homeland. The 400-plus
Minuteman III silos spread across the American West are invulnerable to all but
massive nuclear missile attacks. Thus, their existence sets a high threshold
for attacking the United States, either conventionally or with nuclear weapons.
Without ICBMs, our strategic nuclear targets shrink from 503 to six, which
could all be destroyed with conventional strikes. Only ICBMs require a nuclear
strike.
Second, ICBMs cost less
than the other two parts of the nuclear triad. While a Minuteman III weapon
system replacement will come at a cost; it is likely to prove operationally
cost effective over the long term. It is important to remember that ICBMs are
used every single day to deter our adversaries.
Building new ICBMs
provides the US an opportunity to consider deploying ICBMs in new and creative
ways to deter a broader range of future threats. Instead of just procuring
a new nuclear-capable ICBM, a common launch vehicle capable of carrying
multiple modules might prove a good option.
A
New Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
Some non-traditional
missions a common launch vehicle might provide include:
§
a capability for providing time critical
space assets like sensors, navigation, or communications satellites in response
to a contingency;
§
traditional missions like: ballistic
missile defense; anti-satellite strikes;
§
and prompt
conventional strike.
The benefit of such a
system would be the ability to replace the top of a missile with a different
payload in order to carry out a different mission. At the same time, nuclear
deterrence could be preserved.
Traditional nuclear
deterrence works by creating the fear of a massive retaliatory response in the
minds of a potential adversary. What if ICBMs could also demonstrate that an
adversary’s objectives are beyond reach? Some have speculated that terrorists
may not be deterrable using nuclear weapons, and thus the ICBM force is
irrelevant against these threats.
In the future, a state
or terror group may elect to detonate a nuclear weapon in the upper atmosphere
creating an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). It would not cause direct casualties
but it would cause major disruptions to financial and communication systems
worldwide. If the US can demonstrate the ability to rapidly restore these
systems in the wake of an EMP attack, the incentive to launch such an attack
may be diminished.
A prompt conventional
strike capability (usually known as Prompt Global
Strike — PGS) would also fill a niche role
so the US could strike a fleeting terrorist target or rogue regime.
Given its cost, only a small number of such weapons would be feasible and
useful. They could not
effectively replace nuclear ICBMs.
The concern that a
nuclear-armed opponent might mistake a launch as a pre-emptive nuclear attack
is used against ICBMs providing the PGS capability. However, with today’s
improved communications and space situational awareness capabilities the US can
offer effective advance notification and assurances to Russia and China,
reducing the risks raised by detractors.
Conclusion
While the options for
a Minuteman III replacement are still open, what is not debatable is the fact
that Russia and China both see ICBMs as critical to their own security. It is
now time for the United States to do likewise. When it comes to nuclear
deterrence, symmetry of weapons plays an important role in stability. We should
not forget that.
Col.
Robert S. Spalding III is a B-2 pilot and former military fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations.
Adam
Lowther is a professor at the Air Force Research
Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base. He specializes in
the study of nuclear weapons policy. He was deeply involved in the
Commander Directed Investigation about cheating
and drug use among missileers at Malmstrom Air Base.
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