Domestic intelligence
Michael German December 18, 2014
Why Police Spying On Americans Is
Everyone’s Problem
Editors Note: “Rethinking
Intelligence” is a project of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law that examines the contemporary U.S. intelligence
community, which fellow Michael German argues “has grown too large, too
expensive, too powerful, too ineffective, and too unaccountable to the American people.”
In this occasional
series, Defense One presents a selection of commentaries and interviews
conducted by the Brennan Center with officials from defense, homeland security,
federal law enforcement, Congress, intelligence, and other groups who present
their ideas to improve the business of American intelligence.
Their arguments
tackle three fundamental questions: what is the scope of the new intelligence
community, why does it sometimes fail, and how should the US reform
it? For
more, visit the Brennan Center online.
Many Americans were
shocked to see the militarized police response to public protests this summer
in Ferguson, Missouri. Of course, many working on police reform issues have
identified the growing militarization of police tactics and equipment as
a problem for over two
decades. What is less observable but equally dangerous to American civil
liberties is the increasing militarization of domestic law enforcement
intelligence operations.
The American
tradition of prohibiting military involvement in domestic policing is designed
to ensure that we maintain democratic and civilian control over an
extraordinarily powerful fighting force. An army designed and equipped to
protect Americans should never be turned against Americans except to quell
active rebellion. But just as the drug war fuelled increased military
participation and militarization in domestic policing, the war on terrorism is
driving the militarization of domestic intelligence operations. Unlike the
purchases of armored vehicles, military weapons, and SWATgear, domestic
intelligence activities take place mostly in the dark and neither the public
nor policymakers really know what is happening.
Military intelligence
officials are trained for war against hostile enemies. Their tools, tactics,
and attitudes reflect that mission, and are completely inappropriate to a
domestic application.
In a recent
interview, Erik Dahl, a former Navy intelligence officer and now a
professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, explains why someone who trained to
spy on the Soviet Navy shouldn’t be involved in domestic
intelligence gathering.
Despite such warnings, domestic intelligence programs have become
militarized in three ways.
First, military agencies are conducting domestic intelligence collection
against Americans, and providing that information to law enforcement officials.
The National Security Agency scoops up domestic telephone calling data, as well
as the content of U.S. international
communications (“inadvertently” grabbing tens of thousands of purely domestic
calls each year in the process).
The FBI has direct
access to this material, and can use it for general criminal purposes through
so-called “back door searches.”
Military officials also collect domestic intelligence for “force
protection.” A military unit that was caught spying on anti-war protesters under this
authority was disbanded in 2008, but the Defense Intelligence Agency picked up
its “offensive counterintelligence” duties and re-established an
intelligence database in 2010. National Guard units and civilians working at military agencies have been
caught illegally spying on domestic protesters, and more recently, engaging in
undercover law enforcement activities in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, a law
prohibiting U.S.military
personnel from enforcing criminal laws.
Second, military agencies and personnel participate in formal and
informal information sharing programs on the federal and state level, including
between FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, state and
local law enforcement intelligence fusion centers, and information sharing
networks like the Navy’s Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX),
and the FBI’s
eGuardian program. Though
there are legal limits to the type of work military officials can do within
these programs and the information they can share, there is little to no
oversight conducted to ensure they follow the law.
Third, military intelligence tactics and attitudes rub off on law
enforcement personnel assigned to intelligence matters. Most nations outlaw
espionage, so foreign intelligence activities have to be carried out through
stealth and deception. Avoidance of the law and contempt for the truth can
become habitual among intelligence officials, but they simply have no place in
a democratic government’s interactions with its own citizens. Yet, throughout
the history of domestic intelligence operations in the U.S., law enforcement
officials have gone to the military intelligence toolbox in selecting
their methods.
In 1976, the Church Committee called the tactics J. Edgar Hoover brought
to bear against civil rights and peace activists in the United States “techniques
of wartime” better suited for use against agents of hostile foreign nations
like the Soviet Union. The Attorney General issued guidelines to ensure future FBI intelligence activities would focus on
criminal activity. The Justice Department imposed similar regulations restricting state
and local law enforcement criminal intelligence systems.
Restricting domestic intelligence collection to suspected criminal
activity is essential to the concepts of limited government and individual
liberty, whose foundation lies in what Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis called “the right to be left alone.” It also
reinforces the rule of law. Methods used in criminal intelligence gathering
tend to get exposed in the prosecutions that follow their effective use.
Defendants
can then challenge their legality, while judges, juries and the public can
weigh whether the government tactics are appropriate. Law enforcers can’t be
law breakers.
Unfortunately, the federal government has loosened or ignored law enforcement guidelines restricting
intelligence gathering in the years since 9/11, removing or weakening the
criminal predicates necessary to ensure a proper focus on illegal activity. The
results were predictable —increased police spying on minorities and political
dissidents and increased efforts to escape judicial and public oversight.
Federal law enforcement agencies have adopted policies of “parallel
construction” to mask the surveillance methods they use to gather evidence,
misleading courts and depriving defendants of their right to challenge their
constitutionality. Where evidence of improper FBI surveillance
has leaked to the public, the Justice Department invoked “state secrets”
to shut down litigation. And at the request of the State Police and FBI, the
Virginia legislature exempted its intelligence fusion center from
open government laws.
Trained by the military to spy on hostile foreign nations, Dahl
cautioned that “you wouldn’t want to hire me to conduct domestic surveillance.”
His statement should serve as a warning to those in Congress who authorized the NSA to play a major role in seizing
Americans’ electronic communications (and want to give it more authority over U.S. cyber
security), and sat silent as the FBI has transitioned into a domestic intelligence agency.
It should also serve as a warning to federal, state and local law
enforcement officials. As these agencies have increasingly claimed a role in
intelligence collection, they’ve looked to the military and foreign
intelligence agencies for tactics, expertise and personnel, without
sufficiently recognizing the important distinctions between domestic and
foreign intelligence.
The negative public reaction to recent militarized police tactics
and equipment is an indication of the unease Americans will feel with
militarized law enforcement intelligence efforts. Americans trust the NSA far less than their local police. But when the
local police begin adopting intelligence methods used by the NSA and other foreign intelligence
agencies, they will begin to lose that essential public support.
No one disputes that there are violent criminals, spies and terrorists
within our country and that our law enforcement officials need adequate
intelligence tools to catch them. Requiring that police focus on illegal
activity doesn’t impair their mission, it puts these threats squarely in their
cross-hairs. It is no surprise that Dahl’s research on successfully prevented
terrorist attacks show that traditional law enforcement techniques are far more
effective than NSAmass
surveillance programs.
As Dahl suggests, we need to have a “much better
public discussion about intelligence.”
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